Quantum algorithms

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"Quantum algorithm" means an algorithm that a quantum computer can run.

i.e. a sequence of instructions, where each instruction is in a quantum computer's supported instruction set.

How do we know which instructions a quantum computer will support?

Quantum computer type 1 (QC1): stores many "qubits"; can efficiently perform "Hadamard gate", "*T* gate", "controlled NOT gate".

Making these instructions work is the main goal of quantum-computer engineering.

Combine these instructions to compute "Toffoli gate";
. . . "Simon's algorithm";
. . . "Shor's algorithm";
. . . "Grover's algorithm"; etc.

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General belief: any QC1 is a QC2.
Partial proof: see, e.g., 2011 Jordan–Lee–Preskill "Quantum algorithms for quantum field theories".

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General belief: any QC3 is a QC1. Argument for belief: look, we're building a QC1.

The state of an algorithm

Data ("state") stored in n bits:
an element of $\{0,1\}^n$, viewed as
an element of $\{0,1,\ldots,2^n-1\}$.

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If n qubits have state
$(a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{2^n-1})$ then
measuring the qubits produces
an element of $\{0, 1, \ldots, 2^n - 1\}$
and destroys the state.
Measurement produces element q
with probability $|a_q|^2 / \sum_r |a_r|^2$.

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$(0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 8, 0) = 4|2\rangle + 8|6\rangle$:
Measurement produces
2 with probability 20%,
6 with probability 80%.

Fast quantum operations, part 1

$(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, a_7) \mapsto$
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$(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, a_7)$
is measured as (q_0, q_1, q_2),
representing $q = q_0 + 2q_1 + 4q_2$,
with probability $|a_q|^2 / \sum_r |a_r|^2$.

$(a_1, a_0, a_3, a_2, a_5, a_4, a_7, a_6)$
is measured as $(q_0 \oplus 1, q_1, q_2)$,
representing $q \oplus 1$,
with probability $|a_q|^2 / \sum_r |a_r|^2$.

$(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, a_7) \mapsto$
$(a_4, a_5, a_6, a_7, a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3)$
is "complementing qubit 2":
$(q_0, q_1, q_2) \mapsto (q_0, q_1, q_2 \oplus 1)$.

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Complementing qubit 2
= swapping qubits 0 and 2
∘ complementing qubit 0
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Similarly: swapping qubits i, j.

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$(a_0, a_1, a_3, a_2, a_4, a_5, a_7, a_6)$
is a “reversible XOR gate” $=$
“controlled NOT gate”:
$(q_0, q_1, q_2) \mapsto (q_0 \oplus q_1, q_1, q_2)$.

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Example with more qubits:
$(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, a_7,$
$a_8, a_9, a_{10}, a_{11}, a_{12}, a_{13}, a_{14}, a_{15},$
$a_{16}, a_{17}, a_{18}, a_{19}, a_{20}, a_{21}, a_{22}, a_{23},$
$a_{24}, a_{25}, a_{26}, a_{27}, a_{28}, a_{29}, a_{30}, a_{31})$
$\mapsto (a_0, a_1, a_3, a_2, a_4, a_5, a_7, a_6,$
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Reversible computation

Say p is a permutation of $\{0, 1, \ldots, 2^n - 1\}$.

General strategy to compose these fast quantum operations to obtain index permutation $(a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{2^n-1}) \mapsto (a_{p^{-1}(0)}, a_{p^{-1}(1)}, \ldots, a_{p^{-1}(2^n-1)})$:

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1. Build a traditional circuit to compute $j \mapsto p(j)$ using NOT/XOR/AND gates.

2. Convert into reversible gates: e.g., convert AND into Toffoli.

Example: Let's compute
$(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, a_7) \mapsto$
$(a_7, a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6)$;
permutation $q \mapsto q + 1 \bmod 8$.

1. Build a traditional circuit
to compute $q \mapsto q + 1 \bmod 8$.



2. Convert into reversible gates.

Toffoli for $q_2 \leftarrow q_2 \oplus q_1 q_0$:
$(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4, a_5, a_6, a_7) \mapsto$
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Controlled NOT for $q_1 \leftarrow q_1 \oplus q_0$:
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NOT for $q_0 \leftarrow q_0 \oplus 1$:

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Also, it didn't need extra storage:
circuit operated "in place" after
computation $c_1 \leftarrow q_1 q_0$ was
merged into $q_2 \leftarrow q_2 \oplus c_1$.

Typical circuits aren't in-place.

Start from any circuit:

inputs $b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_i$;

$b_{i+1} = 1 \oplus b_{f(i+1)} b_{g(i+1)}$;

$b_{i+2} = 1 \oplus b_{f(i+2)} b_{g(i+2)}$;

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$b_T = 1 \oplus b_{f(T)} b_{g(T)}$;

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Reversible but dirty:

inputs $b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_T$;

$b_{i+1} \leftarrow 1 \oplus b_{i+1} \oplus b_{f(i+1)} b_{g(i+1)}$;

$b_{i+2} \leftarrow 1 \oplus b_{i+2} \oplus b_{f(i+2)} b_{g(i+2)}$;

...

$b_T \leftarrow 1 \oplus b_T \oplus b_{f(T)} b_{g(T)}$.

Same outputs if all of

$b_{i+1}, \ldots, b_T$ started as 0.

Reversible and clean:
after finishing dirty computation,
set non-outputs back to 0,
by repeating same operations
on non-outputs in reverse order.

Original computation:
(inputs) $\mapsto$
(inputs, dirt, outputs).

Dirty reversible computation:
(inputs, zeros, zeros) $\mapsto$
(inputs, dirt, outputs).

Clean reversible computation:
(inputs, zeros, zeros) $\mapsto$
(inputs, zeros, outputs).

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and fast circuit for p^{-1},
build fast reversible circuit for
$(x, \text{zeros}) \mapsto (p(x), \text{zeros})$.

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Replace reversible bit operations
with Toffoli gates etc.
permuting $\mathbf{C}^{2^{n+z}} \to \mathbf{C}^{2^{n+z}}$.

Permutation on first 2^n entries is
$(a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{2^n-1}) \mapsto$
$(a_{p^{-1}(0)}, a_{p^{-1}(1)}, \ldots, a_{p^{-1}(2^n-1)})$.

Typically prepare vectors
supported on first 2^n entries
so don't care how permutation
acts on last $2^{n+z} - 2^n$ entries.

Warning: Number of **qubits**
$\approx$ number of **bit operations**
in original p, p^{-1} circuits.

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Crude "poly-time" analyses
don't care about this,
but serious cryptanalysis
is much more precise.

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Qubit 0 and then qubit 1:

$(a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3) \mapsto$
$(a_0 + a_1, a_0 - a_1, a_2 + a_3, a_2 - a_3) \mapsto$
$(a_0 + a_1 + a_2 + a_3, a_0 - a_1 + a_2 - a_3,$
$a_0 + a_1 - a_2 - a_3, a_0 - a_1 - a_2 + a_3)$.

Repeat n times: e.g.,
$(1,0,0,\ldots,0) \mapsto (1,1,1,\ldots,1)$.

Measuring $(1,0,0,\ldots,0)$
always produces 0.

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Aside from "normalization"
(irrelevant to measurement),
have Hadamard = Hadamard^{-1},
so easily work backwards
from "uniform superposition"
$(1, 1, 1, \ldots, 1)$ to "pure state"
$(1, 0, 0, \ldots, 0)$.

Simon's algorithm

Assume: nonzero $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$
satisfies $f(x) = f(x \oplus s)$
for every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$.
Can we find this period s,
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Traditional solution:
Compute f for many inputs,
sort, analyze collisions.
Success probability is very low
until #inputs approaches $2^{n/2}$.

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Prepare $n + m + z$ qubits in pure zero state: vector $(1, 0, 0, \ldots)$.

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z "ancilla" bits for reversibility.

Prepare $n+m+z$ qubits
in pure zero state:
vector $(1, 0, 0, \ldots)$.

Use n-fold Hadamard
to move first n qubits
into uniform superposition:
$(1, 1, 1, \ldots, 1, 0, 0, \ldots)$
with 2^n entries 1, others 0.

Apply fast vector permutation
for reversible f computation:
1 in position $(q, 0, 0)$
moves to position $(q, f(q), 0)$.

Note symmetry between
1 at $(q, f(q), 0)$ and
1 at $(q \oplus s, f(q), 0)$.

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Measure. By symmetry, output is orthogonal to s.

Repeat $n + 10$ times. Use Gaussian elimination to (probably) find s.

Example, 3 bits to 3 bits:

$f(0) = 4.$

$f(1) = 7.$

$f(2) = 2.$

$f(3) = 3.$

$f(4) = 7.$

$f(5) = 4.$

$f(6) = 3.$

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

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

Complete table shows that $f(x) = f(x \oplus 5)$ for all x.

Let's watch Simon's algorithm for f, using 6 qubits.

Step 1. Set up pure zero state:

1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.

Step 2. Hadamard on qubit 0:

1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.

Step 3. Hadamard on qubit 1:

1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.

Step 4. Hadamard on qubit 2:

1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.

Step 5. $(q, 0) \mapsto (q, f(q))$:

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1,

0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0,

1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0.

Step 6. Hadamard on qubit 0:

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, $\overline{1}$,

0, 0, 1, $\overline{1}$, 0, 0, 1, 1,

1, 1, 0, 0, 1, $\overline{1}$, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

1, $\overline{1}$, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0.

Notation: $\overline{1} = -1$.

Step 7. Hadamard on qubit 1:

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

1, 1, $\overline{1}$, $\overline{1}$, 1, $\overline{1}$, $\overline{1}$, 1,

1, $\overline{1}$, $\overline{1}$, 1, 1, 1, $\overline{1}$, $\overline{1}$,

1, 1, 1, 1, 1, $\overline{1}$, 1, $\overline{1}$,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,

1, $\overline{1}$, 1, $\overline{1}$, 1, 1, 1, 1.

Step 8. Hadamard on qubit 2:

$0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,$

$0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,$

$2, 0, \overline{2}, 0, 0, \overline{2}, 0, \overline{2},$

$2, 0, \overline{2}, 0, 0, \overline{2}, 0, 2,$

$2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2,$

$0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,$

$0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,$

$2, 0, 2, 0, 0, \overline{2}, 0, \overline{2}.$

Step 8. Hadamard on qubit 2:

$0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,$

$0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,$

$2, 0, \overline{2}, 0, 0, \overline{2}, 0, \overline{2},$

$2, 0, \overline{2}, 0, 0, \overline{2}, 0, 2,$

$2, 0, 2, 0, 0, 2, 0, 2,$

$0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,$

$0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,$

$2, 0, 2, 0, 0, \overline{2}, 0, \overline{2}.$

Step 9. Measure.
First 3 qubits are uniform random vector orthogonal to 101: i.e., 000, 010, 101, or 111.

Grover's algorithm

Assume: unique $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$
has $f(s) = 0$.

Traditional algorithm to find s:
compute f for many inputs,
hope to find output 0.
Success probability is very low
until #inputs approaches 2^n.

Grover's algorithm

Assume: unique $s \in \{0,1\}^n$
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Grover's algorithm takes only $2^{n/2}$
reversible computations of f.
Typically: reversibility overhead
is small enough that this
easily beats traditional algorithm.

Start from uniform superposition over all n-bit strings q.

Step 1: Set $a \leftarrow b$ where
$b_q = -a_q$ if $f(q) = 0$,
$b_q = a_q$ otherwise.
This is fast.

Step 2: "Grover diffusion".
Negate a around its average.
This is also fast.

Repeat Step 1 + Step 2 about $0.58 \cdot 2^{0.5n}$ times.

Measure the n qubits.
With high probability this finds s.

Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after 0 steps:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after Step 1:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after Step 1 + Step 2:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after Step 1 + Step 2 + Step 1:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $2 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $3 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $4 \times$ (Step 1 + Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $5 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $6 \times$ (Step 1 + Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $7 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $8 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $9 \times$ (Step 1 + Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $10 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $11 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $12 \times$ (Step 1 + Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $13 \times$ (Step 1 + Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $14 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $15 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $16 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $17 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $18 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $19 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $20 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $25 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $30 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $35 \times$ (Step 1 + Step 2):



Good moment to stop, measure.

Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $40 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $45 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $50 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Traditional stopping point.

Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$ for an example with $n = 12$ after $60 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $70 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $80 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $90 \times$ (Step $1 +$ Step 2):



Normalized graph of $q \mapsto a_q$
for an example with $n = 12$
after $100 \times (\text{Step } 1 + \text{Step } 2)$:



Very bad stopping point.

$q \mapsto a_q$ is completely described by a vector of two numbers (with fixed multiplicities):
(1) a_q for roots q;
(2) a_q for non-roots q.

Step 1 + Step 2 act linearly on this vector.

Easily compute eigenvalues and powers of this linear map to understand evolution of state of Grover's algorithm.
$\Rightarrow$ Probability is ≈ 1 after $\approx(\pi/4)2^{0.5n}$ iterations.

Textbook algorithm analysis

"WHAT is your algorithm?"

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"Heapsort. Here's the code."

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"$O(n \lg n)$ comparisons; and $\Theta(n \lg n)$ comparisons for most inputs. Here's a proof."

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"WHAT does it accomplish?"

"It sorts the input array in place.
Here's a proof."

"WHAT is its run time?"

"$O(n \lg n)$ comparisons;
and $\Theta(n \lg n)$ comparisons
for most inputs. Here's a proof."

"You may pass."

Algorithms to attack crypto

Critical question for ECC security:
How hard is ECDLP?

Algorithms to attack crypto

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Standard estimate for "strong" ECC groups of prime order ℓ: Latest "negating" variants of "distinguished point" rho methods break an average ECDLP instance using $\approx 0.886\sqrt{\ell}$ additions.

Algorithms to attack crypto

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Is this proven? No!

Is this provable? Maybe not!

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Is this provable? Maybe not!

So why do we think it's true?

2000 Gallant–Lambert–Vanstone: inadequately specified statement of a negating rho algorithm.

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See 2011 Bernstein–Lange–Schwabe for more history and better algorithms.

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Why do we believe that the latest algorithms work at the claimed speeds? **Experiments!**

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Confidence relies on experiments.

Where's my quantum computer?

Quantum-algorithm design
is moving beyond textbook stage
into algorithms without proofs.

Example: subset-sum
exponent ≈ 0.241 from 2013
Bernstein–Jeffery–Lange–Meurer.

Don't expect proofs or provability
for the best quantum algorithms
to attack post-quantum crypto.

How do we obtain confidence
in analysis of these algorithms?
Quantum experiments are hard.

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But public has carried out 2^{50}, 2^{60}, 2^{70} NFS experiments. Hopefully not too much extrapolation error for 2^{80}.

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Analogy: Public hasn't carried out a 2^{80} NFS RSA-1024 experiment.

But public has carried out 2^{50}, 2^{60}, 2^{70} NFS experiments. Hopefully not too much extrapolation error for 2^{80}.

Vastly larger extrapolation for the quantum situation. Imagine attacker performing 2^{80} operations on 2^{40} qubits; compare to today's challenges of 2^1, 2^2, 2^3, 2^4, 2^5, 2^6 qubits.

Simulations

2014.04 Chou $\rightarrow$ Ambainis:
Simulation shows error in
proof of 2003 Ambainis
distinctness algorithm.

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Simulation shows that 2003 Childs–Eisenberg distinctness algorithm is non-functional; need to take half angle.

Simulations

2014.04 Chou $\to$ Ambainis: Simulation shows error in proof of 2003 Ambainis distinctness algorithm.

Ambainis: Yes, thanks, will fix.

2014.04 Chou $\to$ Childs: Simulation shows that 2003 Childs–Eisenberg distinctness algorithm is non-functional; need to take half angle.

Childs: Yes. Typo, already fixed in 2005 journal version.

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Maybe, maybe not.

How many researchers have looked for better attacks?

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Do those researchers have the right experience?

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Real-world security systems cannot avoid these questions.