Computational algebraic number theory tackles lattice-based cryptography

Daniel J. Bernstein
University of Illinois at Chicago &
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Moving to the left

Moving to the right

Big generator

Moving through the night

—Yes, "Big Generator", 1987

2013.07 talk slide online:

"I think NTRU should switch to random prime-degree extensions with big Galois groups."

2014.02 blog post:

"Here's a concrete suggestion, which I'll call NTRU Prime, for eliminating the structures that I find worrisome in existing ideal-lattice-based encryption systems."

NTRU Prime uses primes p, q with field $(\mathbf{Z}/q)[x]/(x^p-x-1)$.

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Take degree-n number field K. i.e. field $K \subseteq \mathbf{C}$ with len $\mathbf{Q} K = n$.

(Weaker specification: field K with $\mathbf{Q} \subseteq K$ and $\text{len}_{\mathbf{Q}} K = n$.)

e.g.
$$n = 2$$
; $K = \mathbf{Q}(i) = \mathbf{Q} \oplus \mathbf{Q} i \hookrightarrow \mathbf{Q}[x]/(x^2 + 1)$.
e.g. $n = 256$; $\zeta = \exp(\pi i/n)$; $K = \mathbf{Q}(\zeta) \hookrightarrow \mathbf{Q}[x]/(x^n + 1)$.
e.g. $n = 660$; $\zeta = \exp(2\pi i/661)$; $K = \mathbf{Q}(\zeta) \hookrightarrow \mathbf{Q}[x]/(x^n + \cdots + 1)$.
e.g. $K = \mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{2}, \sqrt{3}, \sqrt{5}, \dots, \sqrt{29})$.

Define $\mathcal{O} = \overline{\mathbf{Z}} \cap K$; subring of K. $\mathcal{O} \hookrightarrow \mathbf{Z}^n$ as \mathbf{Z} -modules.

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rt-generator problem

gree-*n* number field *K*.

$$K \subseteq \mathbf{C}$$
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$$\subseteq K$$
 and $len_{\mathbf{Q}} K = n.$

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$$\zeta = \exp(\pi i / n)$$
;

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) \hookrightarrow **Q**[x]/(xⁿ + 1).

660;
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;

$$\zeta$$
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Nonzero ideals of \mathcal{O} factor uniquely as products of powers of prime ideals of \mathcal{O} .

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$$Z[(1+\sqrt{5})/2] \hookrightarrow Z[x]/(x^2-x-1).$$

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e.g.
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$$]/(x^{n}+1).$$

$$\exp(2\pi i/661);$$

$$]/(x^n+\cdots+1).$$

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, $\sqrt{5}$, ..., $\sqrt{29}$).

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The short-generate Find "short" nonz given the principal

e.g.
$$\zeta = \exp(\pi i/4)$$

$$\mathcal{O} = \mathbf{Z}[\zeta] \hookrightarrow \mathbf{Z}[x]$$

The **Z**-submodule

$$201-233\zeta-430c$$

$$935 - 1063\zeta - 198$$

$$979 - 1119\zeta - 209$$

$$718 - 829\zeta - 153$$

is an ideal I of \mathcal{O} .

Can you find a should such that $I = g\mathcal{O}^{2}$

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 $201 - 233\zeta - 430\zeta^2 - 712\zeta^2$ $935 - 1063\zeta - 1986\zeta^2 - 329$

 $979 - 1119\zeta - 2092\zeta^2 - 34$

 $718 - 829\zeta - 1537\zeta^2 - 2546$

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 $\mathcal{D} = \overline{\mathbf{Z}} \cap K$; subring of K. as \mathbf{Z} -modules.

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niquely as products of of prime ideals of \mathcal{O} .

$$= \mathbf{Q}(i) \hookrightarrow \mathbf{Q}[x]/(x^2+1)$$

$$\mathbf{Z}[i] \hookrightarrow \mathbf{Z}[x]/(x^2+1).$$

$$\exp(\pi i/256), K = \mathbf{Q}(\zeta)$$

$$\mathbf{Z}[\zeta] \hookrightarrow \mathbf{Z}[x]/(x^{256}+1).$$

$$\exp(2\pi i/661), K = \mathbf{Q}(\zeta)$$

$$Z[\zeta] \hookrightarrow \cdots$$

$$= \mathbf{Q}(\sqrt{5}) \Rightarrow \mathcal{O} =$$

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,

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,

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Can you find a short $g \in \mathcal{O}$ such that $I = g\mathcal{O}$?

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Use LLL short ele

$$A = (20)$$

$$B = (93)$$

$$C = (97)$$

$$D = (71)$$

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$$\mathbf{Q}[x]/(x^2+1)$$

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 $[x]/(x^{256}+1)$.
 $[x]/(x^{256}+1)$.

 $Z[x]/(x^2-x-1)$.

 $\Rightarrow \mathcal{O} =$

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The lattice perspe

Use LLL to quickly short elements of ZA + ZB + ZC + A = (201, -233, -235, -1063, C = (979, -1119, D = (718, -829

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The short-generator problem: Find "short" nonzero $g \in \mathcal{O}$

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,

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is an ideal I of \mathcal{O} .

Can you find a short $g \in \mathcal{O}$ such that $I = g\mathcal{O}$?

The lattice perspective

Use LLL to quickly find short elements of lattice

$$ZA + ZB + ZC + ZD$$
 where

$$A = (201, -233, -430, -71)$$

$$B = (935, -1063, -1986, -$$

$$C = (979, -1119, -2092, -$$

$$D = (718, -829, -1537, -2$$

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The lattice perspective

Use LLL to quickly find short elements of lattice

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 where $A = (201, -233, -430, -712),$ $B = (935, -1063, -1986, -3299),$ $C = (979, -1119, -2092, -3470),$ $D = (718, -829, -1537, -2546).$

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Find
$$(3, 1, 4, 1)$$
 as $-37A + 3B - 7C + 16D$. This was my original g .

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The lattice perspective

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 where $A = (201, -233, -430, -712),$ $B = (935, -1063, -1986, -3299),$ $C = (979, -1119, -2092, -3470),$

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Also find, e.g., (-4, -1, 3, 1). Multiplying by root of unity (here ζ^2) preserves shortness. rt-generator problem:

ort" nonzero $g \in \mathcal{O}$

e principal ideal $g\mathcal{O}$.

$$\exp(\pi i/4); K = \mathbf{Q}(\zeta);$$

$$\mathbf{Z}[x]/(x^4+1).$$

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$$33\zeta - 430\zeta^2 - 712\zeta^3$$
,

$$063\zeta - 1986\zeta^2 - 3299\zeta^3$$
,

$$119\zeta - 2092\zeta^2 - 3470\zeta^3$$
,

$$29\zeta - 1537\zeta^2 - 2546\zeta^3$$

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find a short $g \in \mathcal{O}$

it
$$I=g\mathcal{O}$$
?

The lattice perspective

Use LLL to quickly find short elements of lattice

$$\mathbf{Z}A + \mathbf{Z}B + \mathbf{Z}C + \mathbf{Z}D$$
 where

$$A = (201, -233, -430, -712),$$

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$$92\zeta^2 - 3470\zeta^3$$
, $7\zeta^2 - 2546\zeta^3$

ort $g \in \mathcal{O}$

The lattice perspective

Use LLL to quickly find short elements of lattice $\mathbf{Z}A + \mathbf{Z}B + \mathbf{Z}C + \mathbf{Z}D$ where A = (201, -233, -430, -712), B = (935, -1063, -1986, -3299),

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The lattice perspective

Use LLL to quickly find short elements of lattice

ZA + ZB + ZC + ZD where

$$A = (201, -233, -430, -712),$$

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LLL almost never finds g.

Big gap between size of gand size of "short" vectors

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The lattice perspective

Use LLL to quickly find short elements of lattice

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The lattice perspective

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Increased BKZ block size: reduced gap but slower.

The lattice perspective

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ice perspective

to quickly find ements of lattice

$$B + \mathbf{Z}C + \mathbf{Z}D$$
 where

$$(1, -233, -430, -712),$$

$$5, -1063, -1986, -3299$$
,

$$(9, -1119, -2092, -3470),$$

$$8, -829, -1537, -2546$$
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
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
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
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Various constraints on Log *u*, depending on subfield structure.

e.g. $\zeta = \exp(2\pi i/661)$, $K = \mathbf{Q}(\zeta)$. Degrees of subfields of K:




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
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
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
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For cyclotomics this approach is superseded by subsequent Campbell—Groves—Shepherd algorithm, using known (good) basis for cyclotomic units.