Crypto and the United States Constitution

Daniel J. Bernstein
University of Illinois at Chicago &
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Let's look at crypto from the government perspective.

We're the government. We have a long history of trying hard to understand what people are saying and what people are thinking. ("We listen! We care!")

We've put serious time and money and effort into this goal. ("Collect it all.")

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Lesson #2: We should have
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

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