The impact of side-channel attacks on the design of cryptosystems

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The standard model of senders, receivers, attackers, etc.:

1. Parties perform computation, send messages to other parties.
2. Parties receive all messages, perform more computation, send messages to other parties.
3. Etc.

Party's local computation is not visible to other parties except via message contents. Each party's behavior is completely determined by message contents and local data.

e.g. Diffie-Hellman using
public elliptic-curve point P:

1. Alice generates random a,
computes aP, sends aP.
Bob generates random b,
computes bP, sends bP.

2. Alice and attacker receive bP.
Bob and attacker receive aP.
Alice computes $a(bP) = abP$.
Bob computes $b(aP) = abP$.

Attacker tries to compute the
secret abP from his own data
and aP and bP. Standard model:
attacker has no other inputs.

Traditional cryptography:
Design and implement
cryptographic systems
in the standard model.

Traditional cryptanalysis:
Analyze security of
cryptographic systems
in the standard model.

Build confidence that
contents of messages
don't reveal keys,
don't allow forgeries, etc.
Also aim for high speed.

In the real world,
extra information is
visible through "side channels"
outside the standard model.

e.g. *When* did program finish
computing outgoing message?
Visible to network sniffer.

e.g. When did program finish
processing incoming message?
Visible to the *next* program
run by the same CPU.

e.g. How much power
is program using right now?
Visible to power source.

Often this information
depends on cryptographic keys
(or similarly critical secrets).

Can attacker now compute keys?

In many cases: Yes.

In many cases: Unclear.
Can be difficult to analyze.
Growing research area.

Have built confidence in
standard-model security,
but do we have confidence
in real-world security?
No!

Strategy to regain confidence:
Ensure that all information
visible on side channels
is independent of
cryptographic keys etc.

Independence guarantees that
real-world attacks are as hard as
standard-model attacks.

"Side-channel-immune
cryptographic implementation."

More difficult when there are
more side channels. Extreme case:
Hard to keep secrets in Pay-TV
smartcards given to attackers.

This talk focuses on
software side channels:
load timing, branch timing, etc.

Happy fact: Every cipher,
every signature system, etc.
can be implemented
to keep keys safely away from
all known software side channels.

Replace “all known” with “all”?
I think so, but can’t verify.
Intel and AMD are hiding
security-critical information.
“Proprietary speed data.” Idiots.
But let’s assume “all.”

Unhappy fact:
For many cryptographic systems,
side-channel-immune software
is surprisingly slow.

Happy fact:
Some cryptographic systems
achieve very high software speeds
despite side-channel immunity.

"Side-channel-immune
cryptographic design":
In designing cryptosystems,
aim for security and high speed of
side-channel-immune software,
not standard-model software.

Case study: string comparison

1970s: TENEX operating system
compares user-supplied string
against secret password
one character at a time,
stopping at first difference.

`AAAAAA` vs. `SECRET`: stop at 1.
`SAAAAA` vs. `SECRET`: stop at 2.
`SEAAAA` vs. `SECRET`: stop at 3.

Attackers watch comparison time,
deduce position of difference.
A few hundred tries
reveal secret password.

Objection: “Timings are noisy!”

Answer #1: Even if noise
stops simplest attack,
does it stop *all* attacks?
Need side-channel immunity
to regain confidence.

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Answer #3, what the
1970s attackers actually did:
Increase timing signal
by crossing page boundary,
inducing page faults.

2007: IPsec software uses `memcmp` to check authenticators! TENEX disaster redivivus.

Exercise: Forge IPsec packets.

Typical `memcmp`-style comparison:

```
for (i = 0;i < 16;++i)
  if (x[i] != y[i])
    return 0;
return 1;
```

Fix, side-channel immune:

```
diff = 0;
for (i = 0;i < 16;++i)
  diff |= x[i] ^ y[i];
return !diff;
```

Case study: Montgomery ladder

Montgomery's computation of
$((2n+b)P, (2n+b+1)P)$
from $(P, nP, (n+1)P, b)$
inside fast scalar multiplication:

```
if (secretbit == 1) {
  newnp = g(p,np,n1p);
  newn1p = f(n1p);
} else {
  newn1p = g(p,np,n1p);
  newnp = f(np);
}
```

Naive view:
"This doesn't leak `secretbit`.
It takes the same time whether
`secretbit` is 0 or 1."

Reality: Branch time is an
extremely complicated function
of `secretbit`, previous bits,
branch bits elsewhere in program,
branch bits in other processes,
et al.

`secretbit` influences
time for this computation,
time for other computations,
and time in other processes.

The obvious way to achieve branch-side-channel immunity: Never branch on secret bits.

This is easily doable, and for Montgomery ladder it adds very little overhead.

2005: Bernstein "Curve25519" elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman "avoids all input-dependent branches, all input-dependent array indices"; overhead is "about 6% of the total" time.

How can we do

```
if (secretbit == 1) {
  foutput = f(n1p);
} else {
  foutput = f(np);
}
```

without secret branches
(or secret indices)? Answer:

```
finput =
    ((secretbit-1)&np )
  |(( -secretbit)&n1p);
foutput = f(finput);
```

Full Montgomery, branchless:

```
goutput = g(p,np,n1p);
finput =
    ((secretbit-1)&np )
  |(( -secretbit)&n1p);
foutput = f(finput);
newnp = goutput ^
  ((foutput^goutput)
   & (secretbit-1));
newn1p = newnp ^
  (foutput^goutput);
```

Faster alternative:

Merge flips across loops.

Case study: modular arithmetic

General-purpose libraries
for high-precision arithmetic
often have data-dependent
"skip leading 0" loops.

Integers modulo n are
occasionally shorter than n.
Length leaked by timings.

Fix: Always process integers
to the same length as n.
Eliminating leading-0 tests
normally *saves* time.

More branches in arithmetic?

Kocher's original target
for timing attacks:

```
a += b;
if (a >= n) a -= n;
```

Fix, side-channel immune:

```
a += b;
c = a - n;
secretbit = signbit(c);
c ^= a;
a ^= ((secretbit-1)&c);
```

Often acceptable alternative:

```
a += b; /* that's it! */
```

Exercise: Starting from
extended-Euclid algorithm
or simpler binary variant,
build side-channel-immune
modular inversion.
Replace branches by arithmetic,
use known loop-count limit.

Much simpler, often fast enough:
compute $a^{-1} \bmod p$
as $a^{p-2} \bmod p$.

One modular inversion,
after elliptic-curve scalar mult
using inversion-free coordinates,
is not a big bottleneck.

Case study: AES

AES code: `y0 = T0[x0&255]`
Time depends on `x0&255`,
a byte of plaintext $\oplus$ key.

Attacker can force selected
table entries out of L2 cache,
observe encryption time.
Each cache miss
creates timing signal,
easily visible despite noise
from other AES cache misses,
other software, etc.
Repeat for many plaintexts,
easily deduce key.

Partial fix:
Eliminate all cache misses.

Put AES software into
operating-system kernel.
Disable interrupts.
Disable hyperthreading etc.
Read `T0` etc. into cache.
Wait for reads to complete.
Encrypt some blocks of data.

The bad news: Stopping
cache misses isn't enough.
There are timing leaks
in cache *hits*.

Load-after-store conflicts:

On (e.g.) Pentium III,
load from L1 cache is
slightly slower if it involves
same cache line modulo 4096
as a recent store.

This timing variation happens
even if all loads
are from L1 cache!

Cache-bank throughput limits:

On (e.g.) Athlon,
can perform two loads
from L1 cache every cycle.

Exception: Second load
waits for a cycle if loads
are from same cache "bank."

Time for cache *hit*
again depends on array index.

No reason to think that
these are the only effects.

The obvious way to achieve address-side-channel immunity: Never use secret addresses.

To compute `T0[secret]`: Load `T0[0]`, `T0[1]`, `T0[2]`, ... and do appropriate arithmetic.

Takes time to load all of `T0`. Parallel lookups in one table can save some time (asymptotic cost $O(n \lg n)$ for n lookups in n-entry table), but still quite expensive.

Side-channel-immune AES is disappointingly slow.

Do cipher designers
need secret table indices?

Modern CPUs offer
considerable parallelism:
can compute several independent
adds, xors, etc. each cycle.

We can design ciphers with many
parallel arithmetic operations,
allowing implementors to
exploit CPU capabilities.

Do other operations achieve
the same level of security
at higher speed?

An AES table lookup
mangles its input
more thoroughly than
an addition or xor.

But it is slower and
has a much smaller input.

Side-channel-immune Salsa20
software is faster than
side-channel-vulnerable
AES software despite having
a much larger security margin.

What's safe?

No known side channels in
some operations on current CPUs:

Loads from constant addresses.
Stores to constant addresses.

Constant-distance shifts.
Constant-distance rotations.

Logical operations: xor, or, etc.

Can build all computations
from these operations,
just like building a circuit
from individual gates.

And some more arithmetic:

Additions, subtractions.
No common CPU is believed
to abort carry chains early.

Integer multiplication,
except that large inputs
slow down some CPUs—
CPU implicitly does, e.g.,
`if (input < 65536) ...`

Particularly useful for RSA etc.:
floating-point multiplication
in normal exponent ranges,
except that an input of 0
slows down a few CPUs.

Summary of the impact

Maintaining confidence in
security of cryptographic software,
in a world of side-channel attacks,
takes some implementation effort.

Can avoid big slowdowns
for typical public-key systems.
Small effect on designer.

Much larger slowdown
for typical secret-key ciphers,
except parallel-arithmetic ciphers.
Much larger effect on designer.